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ANATOMY OF THE CASE OF 
ARAB COUNTRIES AND THE WTO
Bashar H. Malkawi*
Introduction
Arab countries are attempting to broaden their engagement in the multi-
lateral trading system in a manner that has many implications. Not only
have some Arab countries either acceded or are in the pipeline of acced-
ing to the World Trade Organization (WTO), but their new commitments
coincide with reorientations in their economic strategies. The purpose of
this article is to examine the involvement in and implications of the multi-
lateral trading system on Arab countries. The proposition in this article
is that the WTO is not a perfect institution. In WTO accession, politics
matter more than commerce or trade. I argue that joining the WTO is
a balancing act. As a result of economic liberalization, there would be
losers in the industries of Arab countries. However, governments should
compensate for any loss by ensuring better access to capital and estab-
lishing training programs to develop the skills of those dislocated. 
The article proceeds to discuss in section I representation of Arab coun-
tries in the multilateral trading system. Section II examines accession of
Arab countries to the WTO and some of the obstacles they face in their
accessions. Section III discusses the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference
held in Qatar in 2001. Section IV studies participation of Arab countries
in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Section V analyzes the impact
of the multilateral trading system on Arab countries in selected sectors
such as agriculture and oil. Section VI uncovers the opposing positions
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of Arab oﬃcials and civil societies in Arab countries toward globalization
and the multilateral trading system. 
I. Arab Countries’ Representation in the Global Multilateral Trading System
The General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (hereinafter GATT) 1947
was negotiated by twenty-three countries. As an agreement, it never itself
came into force. GATT was always applied provisionally through the
Protocol of Provisional Application.1 The GATT operated as an agreement
and a pragmatic institution.2 The GATT 1947 was a code under which
countries would conduct their mutual commercial relations. The purpose
of GATT was to establish an open system of world trade between the con-
tracting parties. It was the beginning for a series of negotiations that ended
up with the establishment of the WTO in 1994. The end of the Uruguay
Round brought with it legalization of world trade politics after GATT was
considered a geopolitical document created to contain the spread of non-
market ideology to other countries. As some legal scholars and WTO
members claim, the WTO has become a rule-based trade body. The
Uruguay Round results both clariﬁed and extended existing GATT obliga-
tions in virtually every facet, i.e., goods, services, and intellectual property. 
From the birth of the GATT in 1947, until 1993, few Arab countries
have joined the GATT-type multilateral trading system.3 Like many other
developing countries, Arab countries, after the end of colonialism, called
for a new world economic order that would take their development needs
2 bashar h. malkawi
1 In order to enter into force, article XXVI.6 of GATT 1947 requires governments
with a minimum share of world trade to deposit their instruments of acceptance. How-
ever, few countries did so. Therefore, GATT was applied through the Protocol of
Provisional Application. See Protocol of Provisional Application to the General Agree-
ment on Tariﬀs and Trade, signed Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A2051, 55 U.N.T.S. 308. 
2 As the acronym of the GATT indicates, GATT’s scope was limited only to tariﬀs
and trade in goods. GATT 1947 did not contain rules aimed at the liberalization of
trade in services and other sectors. An example of GATT 1947 pragmatism is article
XXV (3) & (4) which calls for one vote per nation and decisions to be taken by
majority vote. However, in practice, consensus was developed among parties.
3 Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia were the only countries to
join the GATT 1947. For example, Egypt and Tunisia ﬁrst acceded to the GATT
provisionally. Provisional accession means that GATT contracting parties extend GATT
rights, including tariﬀ concessions, to acceding countries if the latter reciprocate.
However, acceding countries did not have a direct right regarding tariﬀ concessions
negotiated prior to their accession to the GATT. In other words, acceding countries
were not entitled to compensation in case tariﬀ concessions were withdrawn. 
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into account.4 Thus, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD) was born. The UNCTAD was set up as a permanent
organ of the U.N General Assembly in 1964, and it meets every four years.5
In UNCTAD, negotiations were conducted by the bloc approach, with
“the Group of 77” representing the developing countries. UNCTAD can
be best described as the developing countries’ GATT. Over the span of
its life, UNCTAD’s most cited achievement is the Generalized System 
of Preferences (GSP) whereby developed countries give preferential, non-
reciprocal, and non-discriminatory treatment to developing countries’ trade.
Although the GSP has functioned with relative success, its limited coverage
of beneﬁciary countries and products, coupled with conditions that beneﬁciary
countries must meet before being eligible for such a preferential treatment,
led to disgruntled feelings on the part of recipients. Moreover, many of
UNCTAD’s tasks now fall within the contours of the WTO, whose 
membership is essentially the same. However, UNCTAD still has a role to
play, even though the WTO made UNCTAD relatively anachronistic.6
II. The Political Economy of Multilateralism in Arab Countries
The absence of some Arab countries from participation in the WTO is
due to the fact that the U.S. is blocking the establishment of working
parties to examine their applications.7 Since 2000, Jordan and Oman have
anatomy of the case of arab countries and the wto 3
4 The main reason for not joining the GATT system was the doctrine of reci-
procity embedded in GATT. The doctrine of reciprocity obliges countries to recip-
rocate their concessions. See Adeoye Akinsanya & Arthur Davies, Third World Quest
for a New International Economic Order: An Overview, 33 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 208
(1984). 
5 UNCTAD held its ﬁrst meeting in 1964 in Geneva, Switzerland. See Kele
Onyejekwe, International Law of Trade Preferences: Emanations from the European Union and
the United States, 26 ST. MARY’S L. J. 425, 447 (1995) (the foundation of the new
international economic order movement was the theory of “structuralism”, which
called for a fundamental realignment of the international order to correct deep imbal-
ances between developed and developing countries that would, if uncorrected, per-
petuate underdevelopment). 
6 See Jagdish Bhagwati, A Stream of Windows: Unsettling Reﬂections on Trade,
Immigration, and Democracy 29-35 (1998) (recalling the glory of UNCTAD under
the leadership of Raul Prebisch as an institution that was ahead of the curve. The
memory of the institution has faded in OECD countries where it has become common-
place in some inﬂuential quarters to think of UNCTAD as if it was instead UNWASHED
and UNKEMPT. It has been criticized that the institution focuses on politics rather
than economics, and that it is too partisan). 
7 To join the WTO, a working party needs to be established to negotiate terms
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been the last Arab countries to accede to the WTO. If the U.S. is sin-
cerely engaged with Arab countries, it should allow them entry into the
WTO at an accelerated rate. 
Of the 148 current members of the WTO, there are only eleven Arab
countries. Algeria, Comoros, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestinian Authority,
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen have all lined up for
accession to the WTO. However, applications of some of Arab countries
for admission to the WTO are “clinically dead”.8 Other Arab countries’
applications are at a “standstill”.9 The U.S. supports applications of acces-
sion for only handpicked Arab countries that are considered “peaceful”,
however this term maybe interpreted.10 The following is a discussion of
the status of Arab countries’ accession to the WTO and the hurdles they
face in their accessions.
A. Iraq
Iraq became an observer at the WTO overnight.11 Iraq has already
adopted several orders that liberalize trade policy.12 For example, a new
4 bashar h. malkawi
of accession, and the General Council, which operates by consensus, must agree to
form the working party. See Raj Bhala, Challenges of Poverty and Islam Facing American
Trade Law, 17 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 471, 508 (2003).
8 See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Blocks Iranian WTO Application; Syria Prevented from
Placement on Agenda, 19 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 36 ( Jan. 3, 2002) (stating that
Syria’s request for membership in the WTO was blocked because of Syria’s backing
for the Arab League trade boycott of Israel). 
9 See Daniel Pruzin, U.S., EU Push Saudis to Improve Market Access Oﬀers for
WTO Entry, 17 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1654 (Oct. 26, 2000). 
10 See Grary G. Yerkey, U.S. and Saudi Arabia Sign Agreement that Could Lead
to Free Trade Negotiations, 20 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1353 (Aug. 7, 2003) (citing
the term “peaceful countries” used by [former] USTR Robert Zoellick). 
11 See Brussels Resists Demand for Iraq WTO Seat, Financial Times, Jan. 26,
2004, at 4 (the EC resisted a demand by the U.S. and Britain, backed by U.S. Vice-
President Dick Cheney, that Iraq be given a WTO seat. The U.S. argues that a
WTO seat for Iraq would help its reconstruction and adaptation to a market econ-
omy. On the other hand, the EC argues that Iraq does not have a government that
has control over its trade policy). Ultimately, however, Iraq was granted, on a silver
plate, a seat at the WTO as observer, which would allow it to attend WTO meet-
ings but not participate in decision-making or table proposals for negotiations. See
Iraq Takes First Step to Join WTO, Financial Times, Feb. 12, 2004, at 14. 
12 See Judith Richards Hope & Edward N. Griﬃn, The New Iraq: Revising Iraq’s
Commercial Law is a Necessity for Foreign Direct Investment and the Reconstruction of Iraq’s
Decimated Economy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 875, 877, 878 (2004) (cit-
ing the Coalition Provisional Authority order no. 12, which liberalized trade policy
by suspending a number of tariﬀs and trade restrictions. The Coalition Provisional
Authority also issued order no. 39, which instituted far ranging free-market reforms
ALQ 20.1_f2_1-42  4/7/06  3:06 PM  Page 4
foreign investment law was passed in 2003 permitting 100 percent for-
eign ownership of ﬁrms in all sectors of the economy, aside from oil and
other mineral extraction. Iraq has also modernized its existing intellec-
tual property regime by using the laws of Jordan and the United Arab
Emirates as examples, to bring it into compliance with international stan-
dards. Iraq’s overall purpose with these changes is to assist its participa-
tion in the WTO. 
Opening the fragile Iraqi banking system, where lending to the private
sector made up one-half of 1 percent total commercial bank assets lend-
ing in 2004, would create a regime more favorable to mega-foreign banks.
Iraqi banks may not have enough capitalization to compete with foreign
banks. The subsidized agriculture sector is also set for reform.13 Similar
to the example of Iraqi banks, reform in the Iraqi agriculture sector would
beneﬁt the agri-businesses of the U.S. and other major agricultural exporters.
Likewise, Iraqi higher education is also slated for market-oriented reform.
It is no longer the responsibility of the government to ﬁnd graduates jobs;
college graduates would be responsible for their own career searches.
In a country ravaged by war, where only a small percentage of U.S.-
appropriated funds have been put into action, and prime reconstruction
contracts are limited to companies from the U.S., Iraq, and force-
contributing nations such as Australia and Poland, has little time for the WTO
work.14 Furthermore, with many decades of a paternalistic cradle-to-grave
anatomy of the case of arab countries and the wto 5
throughout Iraq in every sector, except for natural resources, banking and insurance.
For banks, after the end of a ﬁve-year period, there will be no limitations on the
entry of foreign banks). 
13 See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Iraqis Face Tough Transition to Market-based Agriculture,
Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 2004, at A01 (Iraq has 5 million agricultural workers, mostly
family farmers. In old Iraq, the state provided seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, sprinklers,
and tractors at low cost. The Coalition Provisional Authority is determined to create
a capitalist economy where the state provides little, if any, support. The U.S. and
Australia [major agriculture exporters] are taking the lead in rehabilitating the Iraqi
agricultural sector. After ﬁrst purchasing and then destroying Iraqi wheat in 2003
because it was of low quality, the gap in food supply was made up with $190 mil-
lions’ worth of wheat from Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, courtesy of the U.S.). 
14 See Resolution of Cultural Property Disputes 23-29 (The International Bureau
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2004) (discussing, in part, the tragic loot-
ing of many of Iraq’s museums as a recent example of how vulnerable cultural prop-
erty is to theft, damage, and destruction. As time has gone by, legal rules have been
developed for the protection of cultural property during hostilities, represented in the
1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conﬂict. One of the obligations included in article 5 of the Convention is
that occupying forces must, as far as possible, support the competent national authority
of the occupied country in protecting cultural property. It is an obligation of stewardship.
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government policy, it is hardly conceivable that such reforms would make
life easier for Iraqi citizens. Iraq needs gradualism, not an instant trade
liberalization, to advance from a closed economy dominated by state-
owned monopolies and subsidies toward a competitive and modern econ-
omy open to world trade.
B. Algeria 
Algeria has been seeking WTO membership for seventeen years, begin-
ning in June 1987. Its accession negotiations are moving at a snail’s pace.15
A sticking point is the import ban on alcohol.16 Some of the stumbling
issues in Algeria’s accession to the WTO include the introduction of new
agricultural export subsidies, application of tariﬀ-rate quotas, and whether
WTO agreements would automatically take precedence over any conﬂicting
internal regulations. Due to these hurdles, it seems that Algeria might top
China in terms of the length of time before being able to secure WTO
membership. 
C. Lebanon
Of the twenty-three original contracting parties to the GATT 1947, only
two, Lebanon and Syria, were from the Arab Middle East. However,
Lebanon withdrew from GATT four years later. Today, Lebanon is not
6 bashar h. malkawi
This did not take place in Iraq. Neither the U.K. nor the U.S. is a party to the
Hague Convention. The experience of UNESCO in many conﬂict situations shows
that only the tiniest fraction of looted materials will be returned). For more on the
dispute between the U.S. and EC over a procurement bar on bidding on $18.6 bil-
lion in reconstruction projects in Iraq see USTR Argues Iraq Contract Exclusion Fall
within WTO Rules, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 12, 2003 (the U.S. argues that
Iraq’s Coalition Provisional Authority, along with the Defense Department which is
responsible for awarding procurement contracts, is not a listed entity covered by the
WTO GPA. As such there is no need to invoke [article XXIII of the GPA] “essen-
tial security” exception to justify the use of noncompetitive procedures in awarding
these contracts. In the alternative, the U.S. can argue that these contracts are for-
eign aid which is not subject to the U.S. commitments under GPA).
15 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Discuss Accession of Algeria, Lebanon, Iraq
Explores Membership Process, 20 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2079 (Dec. 18, 2003)
(Algeria talks stumbled over its ban on imports of alcohol. The Algerian parliament
introduced a ban, which was proposed by religious factions, on imports of alcohol as
part of the budget bill that would expire at the end of 2004).
16 Other WTO members are likely to argue that the basis of the import ban on
alcohol is not religious, but, rather, to protect the Algerian brewery industry, espe-
cially wine. 
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a member of the WTO because it withdrew from the GATT in 1951.
Lebanon did not attempt to join the GATT/WTO until 1999.17
In 1950, Lebanon notiﬁed the contracting parties of its intention to
withdraw from the GATT.18 The only hint for withdrawal was the need
for “readapting”.
One may suspect that the reason for Lebanese withdrawal was the
consideration by Israel to join the GATT.19 Lebanon had at its disposal
an alternative option that it could have invoked, rather than an outright
withdrawal. Article XXXV of the GATT clearly stipulates that the GATT
will not apply between a contracting party (Lebanon in that case) and
an acceding one (Israel) if either one of them does not agree to its appli-
cation to the other party “at the time of accession”.20 Resorting to arti-
cle XXXV is more convincing, especially that article XXXV was added
at the ﬁrst session of the contracting parties in 1948, well before Lebanon’s
withdrawal.21 Therefore, Lebanon could have employed article XXXV if
Israel was to accede to the GATT. 
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17 The Working Party on accession of Lebanon was established in Apr. 1999. 
18 Then Lebanese Foreign Minister Philippe Takal communicated his government’s
intention to withdraw from GATT 1947 without further elaboration for the reasons
of withdrawal. In his communication he said, “I have the honor to inform you that
owing to the necessity of readapting decided to denounce the General Agreement on
Tariﬀs and Trade signed in Geneva on 30 Oct. 1947, and this is in conformity with
Paragraph 5 of the Protocol of Provisional Application signed on the same date.
Lebanon wishes nevertheless to remain a member of the General Conference of the
ITO”. See Notiﬁcations of Withdrawal: Lebanon, Dec. 27, 1950, 77 U.N.T.S. 367. 
19 See Israel’s Present Position in Relation to G.A.T.T., 2:2 Economic News 75,
76-78 (Dec. 1949) (The advantages of Israel’s adherence to GATT would mean that,
within the framework of the MFN doctrine, it would ﬁnd itself in possession of rights
similar to those of other GATT states. The main disadvantage of acceding to the
GATT is the restriction of freedom to enter into bilateral agreements aﬀecting trade
policy. Since Israel was only at the ﬁrst stages of developing its economy, it might
be premature to give up now Israel’s liberty to ﬁnd out which principles it has to
choose as deﬁnite). In 1947, the government of the United Kingdom, acting as a
mandatory power for Palestine, opened negotiations for the accession of Palestine to
the GATT. Negotiations for Palestine’s accession resulted in Schedule XIX, that con-
tained concessions granted by the government of the United Kingdom. However,
after the United Kingdom ceased to act as a contracting party to the GATT with
respect to Palestine, Israel made no declaration indicating its willingness to be bound
by GATT. See The Position of Palestine in Relation to the Agreement: Item 8 of
the Agenda to the Annecy GATT Conference, Apr. 29, 1949, GATT Doc. No.
GATT/CP.3/17, p. 1.
20 India set a precedent when it became the ﬁrst country to invoke article XXXV
in 1948 with respect to South Africa. Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia invoked article
XXXV of GATT with respect to Israel upon their accession to the GATT. See Ariel
M. Ezrahi, Opting Out of Opt-Out Clauses: Removing Obstacles to International Trade and
International Peace, 31 L & POLY IN INT’L BUS 123, 138 (1999).
21 See GATT Analytical Index: Guide to Gatt Law And Practice 961 (6th ed. 1994).
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Lebanon’s talks for accession to the WTO are still at early stage. The
working party on Lebanon accession met in 2003, for the ﬁrst time since
1999.22 Thus far, Lebanon tabled its oﬀer for market access in goods and
services. Lebanon agreed to reduce tariﬀs on agricultural and industrial
goods to 12.5 percent. Further, Lebanon promised to liberalize mobile
phone services, ﬁxed-line telecommunications, and port services.
If one can draw on the experience of China and Taiwan accession to
the WTO, Lebanon may not accede except after Syria’s accession to the
WTO. In the alternative, Lebanon and Syria may accede to the WTO
simultaneously to reduce tensions between the two neighbors. Either way,
Lebanon’s eﬀorts would be handicapped by Syria’s own accession.
D. Syria
Like Lebanon, Syria followed suit and withdrew from the GATT.23 Today,
Syria is not a member of the WTO because it withdrew from the GATT
in 1951. Syria did not attempt to join the GATT/WTO 2001.24
Syria has taken several steps on the path of economic reform. These
include increased imports, such as vehicles, and permitting the private
sector to venture into such ﬁelds as banking, telecoms, TV production, and
higher education. In the context of these reform initiatives, Syria applied
for WTO membership in October 2001. However, four years have passed
since it submitted its application, and no accession is on the horizon. 
Syria is a rogue state, and the U.S. State Department claims that it
supports international terrorism and the Arab trade boycott on Israel,
and harbors elements of the former Iraqi regime. It is unlikely that Syria’s
application to the WTO will be honored anytime soon, especially after the
U.S. Congress passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty
Restoration Act of 2003.25 The Act orders the U.S. President to impose
sanctions against Syria by blocking U.S. exports of any item on the U.S.
Munitions List. Moreover, the U.S. President must also choose two or
more sanctions from a menu of six options, including: prohibiting all
8 bashar h. malkawi
22 See Pruzin, supra note 15.
23 See Notiﬁcations of Withdrawal: Syria, June 7, 1951, 90 U.N.T.S. 324.
24 A formal request for accession under Article XII of the WTO was sent to the
Director-General of the WTO by Syria on Oct. 10, 2001 and was circulated to WTO
members on Oct. 30, 2001. 
25 See Syria Sanctions Bill Passes Senate with Lugar Amendment, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Nov. 14, 2003, at 13.
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exports of U.S. products to Syria with the exception of food and medi-
cine, prohibiting U.S. businesses from operating or investing in Syria, call-
ing for U.S. ﬁnancial institutions to sever dealings with the Commercial
Bank of Syria, freezing of assets belonging to certain Syrian individuals
and government entities, and prohibiting aircraft of any air carrier owned
or controlled by Syria to take oﬀ, land in, or ﬂy over the U.S. The
President has the ﬂexibility to waive sanctions if he determines it is in
the U.S. national security interest. U.S. trade sanctions on Syria may
have little impact on its economy since trade between the two countries
amounted to only $472 million in 2003. Additionally, Syria neither oper-
ates ﬂights to the U.S. nor receives U.S. aid. 
E. Libya
Libya submitted its accession application in November 2001.26 Nonetheless,
the application was blocked by the U.S. because Libya allegedly supports
terrorism. On July 27, 2004, WTO members agreed to set up a work-
ing party to examine Libya’s accession. However, despite headways in
the US-Libyan relationship, Libya still has a long road ahead. The U.S.
has adopted a step-by-step approach toward Libyan’s accession.27 In April
anatomy of the case of arab countries and the wto 9
26 A ministerial committee was established to prepare for negotiations with the
WTO immediately after the Deputy Director-General of the WTO concluded his visit
to Tripoli in Oct. 2001.
27 The U.S. Liaison Oﬃce in Tripoli stated that the pace of travel to Libya is still
hampered by visa diﬃculties. Thus, the U.S. Liaison Oﬃce advises those who plan
to travel to Libya to apply for a visa three to six weeks in advance. See Gray G.
Yerkey, U.S. May Soon Lift Ban on Travel to Libya, Bowing to Pressure from
Business, Congress, 21 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 289 (Feb. 12, 2004). The U.S. ter-
minated the need for license from the Treasury Department to trade with Libya,
allowed direct air service and regular charter ﬂights, and lifted the prohibition against
ﬁnancing through direct loans, credits, and guarantees by the U.S. Ex-Im Bank and
other government agencies. In addition, on the same date, the U.S. terminated the
national emergency declared in 1986 under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act with respect to Libya, and released frozen assets belonging to Libya. New
regulations were issued that would allow U.S. companies to interact with U.S. made
products that were illegally exported or re-exported to Libya before the U.S. trade
embargo was removed. However, the U.S. still bans programs of the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation in Libya. Moreover, the State Department still classiﬁes Libya
as a state sponsor of terrorism, thus prohibiting, with the exception of farm products
and medicine, purchasing U.S. military equipment such as radioactive materials and
explosives, and restricting, through export controls, U.S. high-tech and encrypted
exports such as computers and software. In order for Libya to be taken oﬀ the list
of countries supporting terrorism, there must be eﬀorts by the State Department,
notiﬁcation of Congress, and formal or informal congressional consent. 
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2004, the U.S. terminated the application of the Iran Libya Sanctions
Act to Libya. Moreover, in September 2004, the U.S. lifted its eighteen
year ban on trade between the two countries. The U.S. would help Libya
modernize its economy and infrastructure, which is largely dependent on
gas and oil, ease price controls, and invigorate a working private sector.
F. The Palestinian Authority
In 2001, the Palestinian Authority sent a twenty-four member delegation
for a two-day visit to the WTO to address the issue of its own WTO
accession.28 The Palestinian Authority adopted a foreign trade regime sim-
ilar to that of Israel.29 However, the U.S. and Israel are still likely to
oppose the Palestinian Authority application because of the tension between
the Palestinians and Israelis.30 The WTO agreements are trade agree-
ments, and discussions of broader international law issues should be left
to other institutions. 
Even if there is no tension between the Palestinians and Israelis, the
U.S. and Israel may raise a technical point in opposition to Palestinian
accession. While under article XXXIII of GATT 1994, a “government”
possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial rela-
tions was required for accession, article XII of the WTO Charter allows
a “state” or “separate customs territory” to join its membership ranks.
The Palestinian Authority is clearly a government, but whether the Gaza
Strip and the West Bank form a state is an open question.31
10 bashar h. malkawi
28 See Palestinian Authority Prepares to Pursue WTO Membership; Observer Status
First Step, d82 WTO Rep. (BNA) (May 17, 2001). 
29 Id. As a result of the peace truce, a customs union is formed between Israel,
the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. 
30 Id. The U.S. and Israeli objections prove that WTO accession is not a rule-
based process but rather power-based.
31 Israel usually refers to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as the Territories or
Areas. If the U.S. and Israel raise the technical point, the Palestinian Authority may
argue that the U.N gave its predecessor, the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO), an observer status, a position that allowed the PLO to participate in its dis-
cussions. See Press Release G.A. 9427, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., 89th mtg. (1998).
Moreover, the U.S. extended its GSP scheme to cover Palestinian goods. As such,
Palestinian goods would enter the U.S. at a preferential rate. Therefore, this implies
a statehood status. See Proclamation No. 6778, 60 Fed. Reg. 15, 455 (1995).
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G. Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has been an observer since 1986. It formally submitted its
admission application in 1993. One would question why the Saudis have
extended the period of accession to GATT/WTO, despite the fact that
they are prominent players in the World Bank and the IMF, which man-
date and advocate liberalization policies.32 Whether Saudi Arabia’s acces-
sion to the WTO in 2004 is “imminent reality”, the fact remains that
one cannot predict when it might happen.33 Accession could take place
be as late as 2006 or 2007. 
With respect to its WTO application, Saudi Arabia has opened its
markets to telegraph and fax services, Vsat and GMPCS services, Internet
provision services, and online information and database retrieval services
to non-Saudi operators. Saudi Arabia has also passed several trade-related
laws, including regulations that liberalize capital markets. However, as a
result of the Saudis putting some 100 reservations in market access where
liberalization would not apply, negotiations might take a sharp turn.34
anatomy of the case of arab countries and the wto 11
32 One can speculate that due to the nature of the Saudi economy and its poten-
tial impact on world trade, WTO members are taking a tougher stance on its acces-
sion to the WTO. See Tomer Broude, Accession to the WTO: Current Issues in the
Arab World, 32 J.W.T. 147, 153 (1998) (stating that the Saudi economy ranks among
the twenty largest economies in the world and among the ﬁfteen largest importers). 
33 The accession negotiations ground to a halt in early 2001 after Saudi Arabia
published a negative list on investment, prohibiting access to foreigners in key sec-
tors such as oil exploration. However, Saudi Arabia’s accession to the WTO received
a new momentum after the departure of Osama Faqih, former Saudi commerce min-
ister, who was considered an obstacle for moving the accession talks, and the appoint-
ment of Hashim Yamani as the new one. Moreover, the conclusion of some sixteen
bilateral deals with trading partners, including the one with the EC in Sep. 2003,
provided another impetus for negotiations. Some trade diplomats suspect that Saudi
Arabia may wrap up negotiations in 2004. See U.S., Saudi Arabia Stalled on Insurance
Law, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 17, 2004 (the most contentious negotiations are
with the U.S. over market access in ﬁnancial services and insurance [branching rights
for foreign insurers. Generally, branching is preferred over establishing subsidiaries
since the latter require more capital and are less eﬃcient]. Feeling a sense of urgency,
the Saudis are ready to travel to capitals to resolve outstanding issues. The Saudis’
push for accession is due in part to the desire to improve the strained relations with
Washington after Sep. 11). An interesting point in Saudi Arabia’s accession to the
WTO is whether it should be classiﬁed as a developing, advanced developing, or
developed country. If it is classiﬁed as a developing country, it may qualify for beneﬁts,
if any, accruing to developing countries in their accession to the WTO. 
34 See Saudis Flexible on Easing Investment Curbs During WTO Accession Talks,
Report States, d1 WTO Rep. (BNA) (Feb. 5, 2004) (the latest draft report of WTO’s
working party on accession cites that foreign investment in audiovisual, satellite
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Some of these reservations can be qualiﬁed as measures to preserve Islamic
values and traditions. As an example, Saudi Arabia’s media interests
(audiovisual), which are state-censored for content, are occupied with patri-
otic programming and are oﬀ-limits to non-Saudi interests. Global media
interests such as Viacom will not be allowed to own shares in TV pro-
duction companies or invest in joint production projects with Saudi media
companies. If other WTO members raise objections to these reservations,
Saudi Arabia can argue that France was permitted a “cultural exemp-
tion” clause during the Uruguay Round negotiations. Other Saudi reser-
vations, such as those on prepaid mobile phone cards, can hardly qualify
to preserve Islamic values. 
Saudi Arabia’s accession to the WTO goes beyond concerns over its
import ban on booze and cigarettes. There are several other concerns
with respect to the Saudi application. The application of customs valua-
tion, import licensing, and precedence of international law over domes-
tic law are major concerns for trading partners of Saudi Arabia. Other
obstacles include the huge subsidies paid to rich farmers for growing
wheat in the Saudi desert. In addition, the Dominican Republic’s and
Honduras’ sudden requests for bilateral talks with Saudi Arabia mean
further delays. Some U.S. congressmen oppose Saudi Arabia’s accession
because of its support of the Arab trade boycott of Israel, the Saudi
human rights record, and fears about terrorism. Finally, the U.S. State
Department’s designation of Saudi Arabia, under the International Religious
Freedom Act of 1998, as a Country of Particular Concern could prove
a sticking point in negotiations.
Regardless of Saudi progress towards trade liberalization, realistically,
after accession, Saudi Arabia may need one to two years at minimum to
learn the mechanics of the WTO, and develop a large legal staﬀ to assist
in pursuing eﬀective membership in the WTO. The latter point seems
elusive considering that many Arab countries have small delegations ded-
icated to the WTO. In addition, Saudi Arabia may need more time to
familiarize itself with the thousands of pages of WTO trade rules.
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transmission, land/air transport, real estate are oﬀ-limits. The report’s appendix sets
out some seventy-three products that are prohibited from importations. They include
alcohol, pork, satellite internet receivers, mobile phones ﬁtted with cameras, video
boosters, animal fertilizers, asbestos, used tires, mobile phone chips, prepaid mobile
phone cards, and electronic greeting cards). 
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H. Sudan
Sudan, usually a forgotten country when speaking about international
trade, even though it is an important exporter of gum Arabic, and the
largest country in the African continent, is outside of the WTO club.35
Sudan has adopted an open-oriented policy that includes trade liberal-
ization.36 However, Sudan is unlikely to accede to the WTO anytime
soon, especially in light of the sanctions imposed on it due to suspicions
it supports terrorist organizations. Moreover, a proposed legislation in the
108th and 109th U.S. Congress (H.R. 5414) could cut oﬀ foreign tax
credits and tax deferrals to U.S. companies doing business in Sudan until
it ends genocide in the Darfur region. Similarly to Syria, Sudan is usu-
ally considered a pariah state. 
I. Comoros
Comoros, a small island state, is another forgotten Arab country when
speaking about WTO membership. Comoros has been the recipient of
preferential treatment from developed countries, such as under the Canada
Least Developed Country Tariﬀ treatment and by the U.S. under the
GSP program and the African Growth and Opportunity Act.37 Furthermore,
Comoros has takes several steps to reform its trade regime.38 Since Comoro
has a vulnerable economy with a weak supply capacity, WTO members
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35 The WTO had set up a working party on Sudan’s accession since 1994.
36 The policy of Sudan focuses on enhancing the agricultural sector, which employs
about 70 percent of the population, attracting foreign investors, including Islamic and
Arab funds by reducing taxes and tariﬀs, reducing the inﬂation rate from 166 per-
cent to less than 7 percent, and keeping currency prices stable. See Jim Phipps &
Christopher H. Johnson, Foreign Law in Review: 2001, 36 INT’L LAW. 901, 939 (2002). 
37 See Trade and Development Act of 2000, 106 P.L. 200, 114 Stat. 251 (2000).
Comoros is dependant on the exports of basic commodities such as spices, and oﬃcial
development assistance. 
38 In 1996, Comoros accepted article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement
which requires countries to refrain from imposing restrictions on the making of pay-
ments and transfers for current international transactions, engaging in discriminatory
currency arrangements, or multiple currency practices without the approval of the
IMF. Comoros agreed to pursue sound economic policy. Comoros also took trade
reforms as part of the IMF-supported programs such as Structural Adjustment Facility.
For example, in 1994, Comoros received $1.90 million credit under Structural
Adjustment Facility to support its economic reforms. See Robert Sharer et al., Trade
Liberalization in IMF-Supported Programs 9, 30 (1998) (Comoros began Fund-
supported programs with a relatively restrictive trade regime. However, there was a
marked reduction in its trade restrictiveness). 
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must be moderate in their demands with respect to its membership in
the trade body if it requests to join. 
J. Somalia 
Somalia has also been largely overlooked in the context of the WTO. It
has undergone market-oriented policies.39 After years of conﬂict and chaos,
Somalia is experiencing more political stability that should help it revive
its shattered economy and rebuild the role of its manufacturing sector.
Since many of its industries would not be competitive internationally,
WTO members, when considering Somalia’s accession, must be moder-
ate in their demands for accession.40
K. Yemen
Yemen is another Arab country that is not a member of the WTO.
Modern laws have been enacted that are comparable to those of other
Arab countries.41 Islamic law has been codiﬁed in Yemen covering, among
other areas, trade. Among trade reforms, Yemen removed import restric-
tions for many products, introduced a four-band tariﬀ structure with rates
ranging from 5-30 percent, and harmonized excise tax rates. Additionally,
Yemen opened its wheat trade and distribution of petroleum products,
and removed a price-ﬁxing cartel in the trucking sector. Yet, Yemen’s
accession to the WTO will still face many obstacles.
L. The Arab League 
There have been calls by Arab countries to grant the Arab League an
observer status at the WTO. These calls so far have been received by
deaf ears. Admitting the Arab League to the WTO would strengthen the
position of Arab countries in the organization. The Vatican has been sit-
ting as an observer since 1997 without the intention for applying for
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39 See U.S. Dep’t. Of Com. & Library of Cong., Somalia: A Country Study (1993)
(stabilization and macroeconomic adjustment programs had been implemented dur-
ing 1980s under the auspices of international credit and aid agencies. There has been
a privatization of wholesale trade and ﬁnancial services). 
40 Crop and livestock production, forestry, and ﬁsheries are Sudan’s main items of
exports. Id. 
41 See Phipps & Johnson, supra note 36, at 953. 
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membership. It is preposterous to delay granting the Arab League a seat
to observe the WTO at work.
As to the boycott on Israel, precedent exists permitting an Arab coun-
try to accede to the GATT while simultaneously maintaining its boycott
on Israel. This was the case of the accession of the United Arab Republic,
a union between Egypt and Syria, to the GATT.42 Therefore, accession
of Arab countries to the WTO should not hinge on dismantling their
trade boycott on Israel.
III. The Venue of the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference: Qatar (2001) 
The WTO must hold its Ministerial Conference at least once every two
years. The General Council of the WTO decides on the date and venue
of the Ministerial Conference.43 The Gulf state of Qatar, during the 1999
Seattle Ministerial Conference, voluntarily oﬀered to host the WTO
Ministerial Conference. In 2001, the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference
was held in Doha, Qatar, that brought the WTO ever closer to Arab
countries, and was the largest international meeting in the region.44
Qatar is a small country, and it is not an active member of the WTO,
similar to Canada, Chile, Singapore, or South Africa. Despite these lim-
itations, Qatar was found to have the required infrastructure to host the
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42 The Arab boycott was justiﬁed as a reasonable measure considering the state 
of war between the United Arab Republic and Israel. During the accession negotia-
tions, some contracting parties raised concerns that the United Arabic Republic was
participating in the Arab League boycott of Israel. Members of the working party
supported the concept that such a boycott did not preclude accession, as long as it
was for political purposes and not a disguised trade protection measure. See GATT
ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 21, at 602-03. 
43 There are many factors considered in selecting the venue of the WTO Ministerial
Conference. Those include the capacity to host the conference, proximity of the con-
ference venue to corporate hotels such as Marriott, Sheraton, and Hyatt, and air-
port(s), transportation, local assistance, and security arrangements. Usually, WTO
Secretariat oﬃcials visit the prospective city to determine its infrastructure’s ability to
host such a large meeting.
44 The other WTO Ministerial Conferences were, consecutively: Singapore (Dec.
9-13, 1996), Geneva (May 18-20, 1998), Seattle (Nov. 30-Dec. 3, 1999), and Cancun
(Sep. 10-14, 2003). The sixth Ministerial Conference will be held in Hong Kong (Dec.
13-18, 2005). The usual date for WTO Ministerial Conferences is the Nov. to Dec.
period. During this period in 2001, the Islamic month of Ramadan would come.
Being sensitive to Islamic values, it was decided to hold the fourth Ministerial Conference
earlier (Nov. 9-13). If WTO members did not decide so, trade negotiators would be
hungry. Trade negotiators would not provide the anticipated outcomes.
ALQ 20.1_f2_1-42  4/7/06  3:06 PM  Page 15
meeting.45 It is possible that Qatar was chosen for reasons other than its
infrastructure and the WTO claim of wanting to integrate Arab coun-
tries into the WTO system. 
The 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference was a blow to the eﬀorts of
WTO members to launch the “Millennium Round”.46 The WTO could
not sustain another failure. As such, Qatar was the proper venue to remove
the Seattle stain. In terms of geography, Qatar is far way from the anti-
globalization protestors and anarchists that disrupted the Seattle Conference.47
Even if protestors decided to travel to Qatar, they were unlikely to ﬂock
in large numbers, considering travel expenses and other logistical hur-
dles.48 Protestors were likely to have a low key proﬁle in Doha. Therefore,
to outﬂank a Seattle reoccurrence, Doha was chosen as it is far from
demonstrations, riot police, tear gas, and downtown arrests. 
The sequence of events of the September 11, 2001 tragedy in the U.S.
highlighted the diﬃculty of bringing Arab countries ever closer to the
WTO, which was intended by holding the fourth Ministerial Conference
in the region. After September 11, the U.S. suggested changing the venue
to Chile, after the refusal of South Africa to host the Conference. If WTO
members were sincerely interested in bringing Arab countries within the
framework of the WTO, they could have insisted on maintaining Qatar
as the designated venue. Luckily enough, the momentum was sustained,
and Qatar remained the venue. 
Over the course of several WTO Ministerial Conferences, delegations
of some Arab countries to the Conferences were small in number. Generally,
Arab delegations consisted of a trade minister and two senior trade oﬃcials.
This reﬂects the fact that Arab countries do not have enough ﬁnancial
resources to send full-ﬂedged delegations.49 The small numbers of Arab
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45 See Qatari Trade Minister Stresses Need for Proceeding with WTO Gathering,
d425 WTO Rep. (BNA) (Sept. 26, 2001) (Qatar was prepared to make available 4,440
rooms for attending oﬃcials, some in terms of luxury villas and cruise ships. The pro-
posed venue was the Sheraton Doha Conference and the International Exhibition Center). 
46 There are many reasons for the failure of the Seattle meeting. At this point,
external factors will be counted: Violent protests against the WTO resulted in 600
arrests, $3 million in property damages, and between $12 million and $22 million in
lost business for Seattle merchants. Id. Protestors delayed and disrupted several Seattle
meetings.
47 The largest jam ever in Qatar in which police interfered was the McDonald-
Burger King price war. The two fast-food restaurants engaged in a price war after
Burger King opened in Qatar.
48 While, if the WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Vancouver, Canada,
protestors would have ﬂocked in vans by thousands across the U.S. borders. 
49 The WTO provides three travel tickets, for more you buy your own ticket. Other
international agencies may handle travel expenses such as WIPO or USAID. 
ALQ 20.1_f2_1-42  4/7/06  3:06 PM  Page 16
delegations could be easily compared with hundreds of trade negotiators
representing other countries.50 Delegations consisting of small numbers
would put Arab countries at a disadvantage, especially if, due to an imbal-
anced calendar, several meetings were held at the same time. 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are permitted to attend WTO
Ministerial Conferences.51 NGOs are subject to an accreditation process
by specifying how their activities are linked to the work of the WTO and
sources of ﬁnance.52 However, these requirements are also a potential
drawback for NGOs from Arab countries.53
Over the course of the ﬁve WTO Ministerial Conferences held so far,
few Arab business associations and NGOs have participated. Moreover,
they were limited in representation to one or two persons. For example,
in the third Ministerial Conference held in Seattle in 1999, among approx-
imately 739 associations and NGOs that took part, only three were from
Arab countries.54 The number of Arab associations increased dramatically
in the fourth Ministerial Conference held in Doha in 2001.55 The lack
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50 For GATT Brussels Ministerial Meeting in 1990, the U.S. sent an army of 600
personnel and Japan 300. Perhaps out of security reasons, U.S. trade delegation to
the Doha Ministerial Conference had a low turnout of less than 100. 
51 NGOs’ attendance is limited to plenary sessions but not other meetings. 
52 See Non-Governmental Organizations, Facilities Provided During the WTO
Ministerial Conference in Singapore, Aug. 26, 1996, PRESS/TE 012. An obvious
reason for the accreditation process is to prevent NGOs with “hidden agenda” from
participating. Coincidentally, the title of the document refers to trade and environ-
ment. One assumes that some environmental NGOs have hidden agenda. 
53 Some Arab NGOs might be interested in the work of the WTO although their
activities are not linked to the work of the WTO. 
54 Two were from Egypt (Group of Fifteen-Federation of Chambers of Commerce,
Industry and Services and the Central Agricultural Co-op Union) and one from Sudan
(Sudanese Business Men and Employers Federation).
55 Out of approximately 365 associations and NGOs participating in the Conference,12
Arab associations participated: six were from Jordan (Arab Knowledge Management
Society, Arab Society for Certiﬁed Accountants, Arab Society for Intellectual Property,
Licensing Executives Society-Arab Countries, National Society for Consumer Protection,
PhRMA East/Africa Committee), one from Lebanon (Arab NGO Network for Devel-
opment), three from Egypt (Centre for Trade Union and Workers Services, Group of
Fifteen-Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Services, National Asso-
ciation for Human Rights and Development), one from Syria (International Confederation
of Arab Trade Unions), and one from Saudi Arabia (Women and Children International).
The number of Arab associations and NGOs in the ﬁfth Ministerial Conference in
Cancun in 2003 dropped back to 8 out of 1002: three from Egypt (Afro-Asian People’s
Solidarity Organization, Center for Trade Union and Workers Services, Federation
of Egyptian Industries), two from Jordan (Arab Knowledge Management Society,
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America-Jordan), one from Lebanon
(Arab NGO Network for Development), one from Iran (Confederation of Iranian
Industry), and one from Tunisia (Union Tunisienne de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche). 
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of expansive Arab associations and NGOs participating in WTO Ministerial
Conferences can be attributed to a lack of interest or understanding of the
WTO mechanics or, more importantly, due to lack of ﬁnancial resources. 
Inter-governmental organizations also participate in WTO Ministerial
Conferences. For example, in the Doha Ministerial Conference of 2001,
sixty-two inter-governmental organizations were permitted to participate.
One noticeable group that was missing from participation in WTO
Ministerial Conferences was the League of Arab States, one of the old-
est regional organizations of states in the world. Despite various attempts
by the League to obtain an observer seat at WTO Ministerial Conferences
as well as at various meetings, the League’s eﬀorts have thus far been
fruitless.56 Several WTO members have objected to such requests on the
pretext that the League of Arab States promotion of boycott of Israel is
contrary to WTO rules. Clearly, the objections of these members are
politically motivated rather than legally justiﬁed. WTO rules provide the
means for integrating the functions of international, regional, and country-
speciﬁc inter-governmental organizations, including the IMF, World Bank,
and the OECD.57 In return for blocking the League of Arab States’ appli-
cation for observership, Arab countries such as Egypt blocked applica-
tions of other inter-governmental organizations.58 For example, the U.N
Commissioner for Human Rights was not granted observer status in the
Council for Trade in Services.
At the end of the Ministerial Conference in Qatar, members marked
the launch of new round of multilateral trade negotiations. Aside from
being considered “developing countries”, the question that arises is what
Arab countries achieved during the meeting. One of the immediate beneﬁts,
from the perspective of Qatar, is that the new round was dubbed “the
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56 For instance, the League of Arab States was not permitted to participate as an
observer in the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun in 2003. Hussein Hassouna,
Ambassador of the League of Arab States to the U.S., Address and Remarks at
American University Washington College of Law (Apr. 21, 2004). On the other hand,
Qatar courteously hosted the Israel delegation in the Fourth Ministerial Conference
in Doha. Usually, the WTO issues invitations to members and other organizations
to attend its Ministerial Conferences. 
57 Article V.1 of the WTO Charter states that the General Council shall make
“appropriate arrangements” for eﬀective cooperation with other inter-governmental
organizations that have responsibilities related to those of the WTO. Thus, members
of the WTO recognized, though without any speciﬁc reference to any inter-govern-
mental organization, other legal entities as part of the wider economic order. 
58 See Robyn Eckersley, The Big Chill: The WTO and Multilateral Environmental Agreements,
4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 24 (May 2004) (admission of observers has been dealt
with on an ad hoc basis. The continuing impasse on the observer problem can be
resolved only at the General Council level). 
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Doha Development Agenda”.59 Additionally, Qatar boosted its conven-
tion and tourism industry, even if such a boost was only temporary.60
However, there have not been any long-range economic beneﬁts from
hosting the Conference. 
The WTO Ministerial Conference in Qatar oﬀered Arab countries the
opportunity to demand concessions from developed countries. Arab coun-
tries missed that opportunity because of self-interest in gaining global pres-
tige by holding the Ministerial Conference in the region and fostering
closer relationships with the U.S. Arab countries did not solidify their
positions in the WTO Ministerial Conference in Qatar. In the WTO
Ministerial Conference in Qatar, coalitions from other developing coun-
tries managed to derive concessions from developed countries.61 For exam-
ple, the alliance between India, Argentina, Mexico, and Israel, among
other countries, succeeded in including anti-dumping and countervailing
rules in the Doha Round to clarify and improve WTO agreements on
these matters. African countries succeeded in obtaining a waiver from
WTO rules for the Conotu Agreement, which provides former colonies
and African, Caribbean and Paciﬁc countries (ACP) favorable access to
the EC market. Moreover, African countries reached a deal with devel-
oped countries on intellectual property and public health aimed at pla-
cating concerns about the impact of patent protection on the availability
of essential medicines in African countries. 
An Arab alliance should be formed so that they can form peer pres-
sure to demand concessions from developed countries in WTO Ministerial
Conferences and meetings. The alliance should also aﬀord the help
requested by its constituent members. The Arab alliance is needed, con-
sidering that Arab countries are now faced with the daunting task of
understanding complex and extensive trade negotiations in which they
will participate over the next several years, while still digesting the raw
deals of the Uruguay Round. 
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59 The “Doha Development Agenda” will enter the history of trade rounds along
with the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round. It is of notice that the Doha
Ministerial Declaration of 2001 uses the term “work program” instead of the politi-
cally sensitive term “trade round”. For example, the term “work program” was used
seventeen times while “round” was referred to only one time in the context of the
Uruguay Round. See Doha Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 14, 2001, WTO Doc. No.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1.
60 Qatar may have built facilities such as rooms that cost million of dollars to be
used only for one time.
61 See Inaamul Haque, Reﬂections on the WTO Doha Ministerial: Doha Development Agenda,
17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1097 (2002). 
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IV. Arab Countries’ Participation/Non-Participation in the WTO Dispute
Settlement Mechanism
Arab countries are frequent users of the WTO dispute settlement mech-
anism. The WTO dispute settlement system has been in eﬀect for nearly
ten years. Over the span of that period, of a total of ninety-two WTO
members who participated in dispute proceedings, no Arab country has
ever initiated a case before a panel as a complainant.62 Further, through
the end of 2004, Egypt has been the only Arab country that has been a
respondent in a case.63 This state of aﬀairs may indicate that Arab coun-
tries are not rule breakers. Another interpretation is that Arab countries
choose to settle their disputes with other WTO countries through con-
sultations. Reasons for this include high fees charged by international law
ﬁrms for representation in the litigation, or fear of spillover eﬀects on
ﬁnancial aid. 
Lack of participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings may also
be attributed to the minuscule level of the Arab countries’ contribution
to world trade, contrasted with $1 billion a day of trade between the
U.S. and EC.64 However, this is by no means a completely valid reason
to not participate in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Argentina, for
example, which accounts for only 0.6 percent of world trade, is one of
the most challenged nations before the WTO, after the U.S. and the EC.
Argentina has also ﬁled nine complaints in the WTO. Additionally, India
is an active participant in the WTO dispute settlement cases despite the
fact that its share of world trade is under 0.8 percent. 
Another reason that Arab countries are not frequent users of the WTO
dispute settlement system is a lack of expertise and knowledge of com-
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62 See Dispute Settlement Body, Overview of State of Play of WTO Disputes, Nov.
18, 2002, WTO Doc. No. WT/DSB/W/209/Add.1. 
63 See Egypt-Deﬁnitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey, Aug.
8, 2002, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS211/R. In the Steel Rebar case, in which Egypt
presented an excellent argument, its counsel was Van Beal and Bellis of Brussels,
Belgium. See Internet Chat with E.U. Commissioner Pascal Lamy and Egyptian Trade
Minister Youssef Boutros-Ghali, New WTO Round: Talking Trade-What’s Going
on?, at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/chat/lamy9/index_en.htm> (Last visited May
30, 2005).
64 See Grary G. Yerkey, U.S. Trade Policy Overlooks Middle East Region, Could
Hurt War on Terrorism, PPI Study Says, 20 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 323 (Feb. 13,
2003) (the Muslim world has experienced a 75% drop in its share of world export
since 1980. As of 2001, the entire Muslim world received only $13.6 billion in FDI,
barely more than Sweden all by itself ). 
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plicated WTO law, with some complaints crossing between several WTO
agreements. Bringing a case before a WTO panel is an extensive process
that requires preparing commercial data, studies, econometric modeling,
and substantial documentation. However, with the passing of time and
the growing knowledge of the WTO law, one might expect more use of
the WTO dispute settlement system. 
Litigating a WTO case, which may take years, is very costly. For exam-
ple, Brazil, in its 2004 case against U.S. upland cotton subsidies, incurred
an estimated $2 million in legal fees at the WTO panel level alone.65
Unless some Arab countries share the legal and ﬁnancial burdens of pro-
ceedings at the WTO, it might be very diﬃcult for a single Arab coun-
try to initiate a case alone. Therefore, spreading the cost among Arab
countries would make the process more aﬀordable for Arab countries to
be involved.
In addition, power relations may play role in limiting Arab countries’
participation in trade disputes. For example, Egypt may have been in a
Scylla and Charybdis position when it decided to settle its dispute with
the EC out of court.66 If Egypt supported the U.S. in the sensitive GMO
case, it would have upset its relations with the EC. By the same token,
if Egypt did not support the U.S., it would have lead to a souring in
trade relations between the U.S. and Egypt. Ultimately, Egypt chose to
settle the dispute with the EC without litigation. Perhaps, without pres-
sure, Egypt may have pressed ahead with the dispute against the EC. 
Arab traditions and history may outweigh all other reasons for the lim-
ited participation by Arab countries in WTO dispute settlement cases.
International litigation is not a preferred choice for Arab countries. Nego-
tiations and compromises are the traditional path. It is a question of style.
One hopes that, in the future, the process may become more con-
frontational, in order for Arab countries to press their interests in trade
disputes without compromising, which otherwise would occur in negoti-
ations. Through litigation Arab countries would send a signal to other
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65 On appeal, Brazil is likely to incur more costs. For more on the case see United
States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, May 23, 2003, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS267/15. 
66 See Grary G. Yerkey and Christopher S. Rugaber, U.S. and Egypt Beginning
to See “Eye-to-Eye” on Need for FTA but No Talks Scheduled Yet, 20 Int’l. Trade
Rep. 1145 ( July 3, 2003) (quoting Boutros-Gali, Egypt’s [former] foreign trade min-
ister, saying that Egypt wants to begin the [US FTA] negotiations “tomorrow”.
However, the U.S. has been cold toward negotiating an FTA with Egypt. Some hint
that this so because Egypt withdrew its support of the U.S. in the Genetically Modiﬁed
Organism case against the EC).
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WTO members that negotiation is one option for resolving a trade dis-
pute, but not the only option. Arab countries should employ negotiation
and litigation at the same time because litigation plays an important role
in informing negotiations.
There are some provisions in the Dispute Settlement Understanding
of the WTO that give special treatment for developing and least-devel-
oped countries.67 An important step has been taken to assist developing
countries in WTO disputes settlement through the establishment of the
Advisory Center on WTO Law.68 Four Arab countries are members of
the Advisory Center.69 The Advisory Center resembles a law oﬃce that
specializes in WTO law. Despite several limitations on the functions of
the Advisory Center, Arab countries should consider becoming involved
in the Center until they have their own in-house counsels and expertise
in international trade law. 
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67 For example, according to article 27.2 of the DSU, the WTO Secretariat pro-
vides assistance to developing countries through the legal advice of experts in dispute
settlement. However, legal assistance from the WTO Secretariat is qualiﬁed “in a
manner ensuring the continued impartiality of the Secretariat”. In other words, legal
assistance through the WTO Secretariat is not full but limited to the extent that the
Secretariat’s neutrality is not compromised.
68 The Advisory Center is independent from the WTO, established as a founda-
tion under Swiss law. The Advisory Center is open to all WTO members, but only
developing countries and economies in transition can use its services. The Advisory
Center sources of income are: user charges, revenues from an endowment fund, and
traditional donor contributions. The Advisory Center organizes seminars on WTO
jurisprudence, oﬀers legal advice on WTO law, provides support in WTO proceed-
ings, and permits internships for oﬃcials dealing with WTO legal issues. One of the
criticisms directed toward the Advisory Center is that there may be real duplication
between its work and the work of the WTO Technical Cooperation Division. Other
criticisms are the limited number of professionals, and the estimated hours per case
(700 hours for a simple case). Even more, the Advisory Center executive director will
have the power to decide whether a case brought to the Center by a developing
country has legal merit or not. See Kim Van der Borght, The Advisory Center on WTO
Law: Advancing Fairness and Equality, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 723, 724-727 (1999). 
69 Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Oman are members of the Advisory Center. Egypt
and Tunisia are original members of the Advisory Center, which signed the agree-
ment establishing the Center, while Jordan was the ﬁrst country to accede to the
agreement, followed by Oman. Late Said El-Naggar of Egypt, former Appellate Body
member, held a seat in the management board for two years term starting 2001. See
<http://www.acwl.ch/> (Last visited May 4, 2005). 
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V. The Impact of the International Trading System on Arab Countries
The WTO created a new reality, and Arab countries cannot aﬀord not
to join.70 Arab countries cannot get engaged in the multilateral trading
system without being part of the WTO. With the world becoming more
and more economically integrated, Arab countries will have the chance
to be involved, and their interests represented appropriately.71 In an era
of internationalizing the economy, any Arab country which does not join
would be isolated. 
Adhering to the rules of the WTO may enhance global conﬁdence in
the Arab countries, and thus is likely to increase foreign direct invest-
ment.72 As for individual Arabic citizens, one can imagine how consumers’
lives would be if goods not made in their home countries became avail-
able at their ﬁngertips. The loss of sovereignty is not speciﬁc to Arab
countries, but for all countries joining the WTO.73 Membership in the
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70 The following are the Arab countries that joined the WTO: Bahrain ( Jan. 1,
1995), Djibouti (May 31, 1995), Oman (Nov. 9, 2000), Qatar ( Jan. 13, 1996), United
Arab Emirates (Apr. 10, 1996), and Jordan (Apr. 11, 2000). In addition there are
seven other Arab countries in the process of joining: Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen.
71 Developing countries had noticeable impacts on developed countries in the WTO.
For example, Guatemala and Ecuador, not satisﬁed with the settlement of the banana
dispute, blocked the proposal of the EC to obtain a waiver for the Fiji Convention
that gives preferential treatment for African, Caribbean, and Paciﬁc (ACP) countries.
Developing countries played an important role in the debate over the selection of the
Director General for the WTO to replace Renato Ruggeiro in 1999. Additionally,
developing countries aired their concerns toward the green room negotiations mod-
ule in the Seattle Ministerial meeting. See Strengthening Relations with Arab and
Islamic Countries through International Law: E-Commerce, WTO Dispute Settlement
Mechanism, and Foreign Investment 182-183 (The International Bureau of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2002).
72 Personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to compete, and security of pri-
vately-owned property are the cornerstones of economic freedom. In a study con-
ducted on economic freedom in the world, Jordan ranked 36 in 2002, Bahrain ranked
31, Morocco ranked 83, and Egypt ranked 74. See James Gwartney & Robert Lawson,
Economics Freedom of the World: 2004 Annual Report 53, 81, 107, 120 (2004). 
73 The U.S. and other developed countries have much more to worry about in terms
of sovereignty since they have many great issues at stake. For more on sovereignty
see Jenik Radon, Sovereignty: A Political Emotion, Not a Concept, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L.
195, 203, 208 (2004) (despite the long history of the sovereignty concept, it has always
been a term in search of a deﬁnition. The notion of sovereignty has always been
problematic and ephemeral. The U.S. approach toward sovereignty is grounded on the
legacy of American exceptionalism. For the U.S., joining the WTO met with opposition
and suspicion. Joining the WTO amounted to the surrender of U.S. sovereignty. On
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WTO would ensure Arab countries a fair forum for settling their potential
trade disputes with other members who may wield more trading power.
Reviewing some of the WTO cases would highlight this fact.74 In addi-
tion, WTO agreements have safety valves, such as anti-dumping mea-
sures, that can be used provisionally to counter imports.
The multilateral trading system will have profound eﬀects on the Arab
countries collectively. For those countries that joined the WTO, this means
that they will have to abide by its rules. For those that are outside of
the WTO, they will have to undertake regulatory reforms. Beneﬁts are
likely to materialize once the Arab countries enact a broad package of
laws and regulations. This does not mean that some Arab industries are
not likely to be negatively aﬀected. While it is recognized that adjustment
to trade liberalization will be neither automatic nor painless, any nega-
tive impact on Arab import-competing industries may be compensated
by exportable industries and governments by ensuring better access to
capital, and establishing training programs to develop the skills of those
dislocated. Measuring the impact of WTO accession on Arab countries
in diﬀerent sectors, such as ﬁnancial services, intellectual property rights,
and customs laws, just to mention few, requires extensive studies and
analyses that are beyond the limits of this section.75 Therefore, this sec-
tion will analyze the implications of the WTO on Arab countries in
selected sectors.
A. Agriculture
Until the Uruguay Round, agriculture was under softer disciplines. The
WTO Agreement on Agriculture contains new regulations in this sector.
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture covers three pillars: market access,
export subsidies, and domestic support.76
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the other hand, for small countries, accession to regional and global bodies gives them
more sovereignty). Under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, any member of
Congress can oﬀer a joint resolution every ﬁve years to have the U.S. withdraw from
the WTO. This is an example of U.S. concern over ceding its sovereignty by join-
ing the WTO.
74 See Report of the Appellate Body on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1996, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS58/AB/R.
75 For some sectoral studies on the WTO and Arab countries see Opening Doors
to the World: A New Trade Agenda for the Middle East (Raed Safadi ed., 1998). 
76 Restrictions on market access of agriculture were in the form of tariﬀs and non-
tariﬀ barriers. WTO members agreed to tariﬀy non-tariﬀ barriers in binding recorded
schedules, with tariﬀs resulting from this process to be reduced by an average 36 per-
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Arab countries’ agriculture sectors are in primitive stages. Arab coun-
tries are facing an ever increasing challenge to acquire adequate food to
feed their populations. Although some parts of the region have been his-
torically exporters of agricultural products, now they are, to a large extent,
dependent on staple food imports.77 Many Arab countries post a trade
deﬁcit in farm products. 
There are many reasons for the decline of agriculture in Arab coun-
tries. Agriculture policy in Arab countries, which is diﬀerent from devel-
oped countries, plays a role in this state of aﬀairs.78 Arab agriculture
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cent in case of developed countries and 24 percent for developing countries, with
minimum reductions for each tariﬀ line required. This process is known as the Uruguay
Round formula. Regarding export subsidy, developed countries committed to reduction
at a level of 36 percent below the 1986-1990 base level, and the quantity of subsidized
exports by 21 percent over the same period. In the case of developing countries, the
reductions are two-thirds of those of developed countries. The implementation period
is six years for developed countries, starting Jan. 1 1995, and ten years for develop-
ing countries regarding direct export subsidy. Some WTO members calculated very
high levels of equivalent tariﬀs in replacement of non-tariﬀ barriers. To alleviate such
a problem, members provided three approaches: current market access, minimum
access quotas where current access is less than 3 percent of domestic consumption,
and special treatment for some products such as rice. For more on the WTO Agriculture
Agreement see Melaku Geboye Desta, Food Security and International Trade Law: An
Appraisal of the World Trade Organization, 35.3 J. World Trade 450-452 (2001). 
77 See Roni N. Halabi, Stability in the Middle East through Economic Development: An
Analysis of the Peace Process, Increased Agricultural Trade, Joint Ventures, and Free Trade Agreements,
2 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 275, 284 (1997) (twenty Arab countries purchased $27.3
billion worth of agricultural products in 1993). 
78 For example, Arab countries tax farmers so that urban populations can pur-
chase farm products at lower prices. In order to compensate for taxing farmers, Arab
countries subsidize inputs, such as irrigation, thus providing artiﬁcially low-cost water.
However, with taking on economic reforms under the aegis of international agencies,
subsidizing inputs is no longer a viable approach. Moreover, Arab countries lack for-
eign exchange to subsidize agriculture. On the other hand, developed countries, such
as the U.S. and EC, tax urban populations to ensure income support for farmers.
Rather than subsidizing inputs, developed countries subsidize agriculture output.
Therefore, domestic Arab farm products priced higher than imported ones. Developed
countries’ agricultural exporters “dump” their surplus productions in Arab countries’
markets, eroding what is remaining of the agriculture sector in these Arab countries.
Water scarcity in the region is another reason for the decline in agriculture. However,
although it is valid, this is not all true. A further reason for insuﬃcient grain harvest
could be due to giving more emphasis on value-added crops such as fruits and veg-
etables. One could argue that this works for Arab countries’ comparative advantage,
since they have large pools of labor and little arable land. For more on the U.S.
agricultural policy see J.W. Looney et al., Agriculutral Law: A Lawyer’s Guide to
Representing Farm Clients 5-10, 191-205 (1990) (many of the U.S. support programs
date back to the farm ﬁnancial crises of the 1930s and 1980s. Certain reasons may
provide an explanation for the divergent treatment of agriculture in the U.S. First,
farming is viewed as a unique way of life dependant on natural forces which are
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sectors are relatively subsidy-free while developed countries provide mas-
sive agricultural subsidies, thus causing lower prices, and harming farm-
ers in Arab countries. Arab countries are experiencing a lack of young
farmers. Many farming households derive most of their income from non-
agricultural activities.79 Arab agricultural technology, such as mechaniza-
tion and large farm operations, is also not on the same level as that of
their foreign counterparts, which results in high output costs and low
international competitiveness. Additionally, exports of agricultural and
ﬁshery products from Arab countries face a myriad of safety and envi-
ronmental regulations in foreign markets. For example, Oman was allowed
to export wild shrimp to the U.S. in 2005, only after the State Department
certiﬁed that its ﬁshing operations do not threaten endangered sea tur-
tles because Oman harvests shrimp using manual rather than mechani-
cal means to retrieve nets.80 Other regulatory measures imposed by the
U.S. include mandatory country-of-origin labeling for meat and meat
products. Safety and environmental regulations make it burdensome for
agricultural and ﬁshery products from Arab countries to penetrate for-
eign markets. 
The measurement of the potential impact of liberalization in agricul-
tural trade on Arab countries requires one to take into account various
scenarios covering matters such as preferential market access, prices of
food products, farm spending, bioengineered foods, safeguard measures,
agricultural export credits, and food aid. Many Arab countries enjoy pref-
26 bashar h. malkawi
beyond the farmer’s control. Farmers are also viewed as a stabilizing element in soci-
ety because of their vital role in food and ﬁber production. Farmland is a major
source of aesthetically and psychologically pleasing open space and locale for many
non-farm recreational activities. Farmers are a distinct minority in the U.S. They con-
stitute about 2 percent of the total population. Farmers receive specialized legal treat-
ment as an attempt to protect them from the generally urban orientation of law and
government. Lastly, their lack of participation beyond the production stage of agri-
culture is a contributing factor to their inability to attain adequate income). 
79 See Trade Policy And Economic Integration in the Middle East and North
Africa: Economic Boundaries in Flux 186, 202 (Hassan Hakimian & Jeﬀrey B. Nugent
eds., 2004).
80 Under U.S. law, wild shrimp imports are barred if harvested in ways harmful
to endangered sea turtles. However, the import bar is inapplicable if the State
Department certiﬁes that the harvesting nation has taken steps to reduce the inci-
dental taking of turtles in shrimp trawling operations, such as the use of sea turtle
excluder devices, or has a ﬁshing environment that poses no threat to sea turtles,
such as ﬁshing in cold water regions not frequented by sea turtles. The shipment of
shrimp must be accompanied by the State Department form DS-2031 signed by the
exporter, importer, and government oﬃcial from the harvesting nation. See
Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609, 103 Stat. 988 (1989). 
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erential access to the EC market as a result of successive trade deals.81
The erosion of such preferences is a matter of time, in part because of
a willingness among nonrecipient countries to challenge such arrange-
ments through the GATT/WTO dispute settlement.82 Moreover, existing
preferences could be undermined by tariﬀ reduction commitments in the
Doha negotiations on agriculture. Therefore, Arab countries must press
members of the WTO to retain preference margins, delay the erosion of
preferences resulting from reductions in tariﬀs, and make compensation
payments to beneﬁciary Arab countries. 
As a result of further liberalization in agriculture, it is expected that
the price tag of imported food products will increase. Arab net food-
importing countries would likely to face some diﬃculties.83 Therefore, in
WTO trade negotiations, one could anticipate that some Arab countries
would be in a defensive position or low-proﬁle proponents of agricultural
trade liberalization. Any reduction in subsidies by developed countries for
their agriculture exporters would translate into a higher food import bill
for Arab countries. 
Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, have undertaken programs to
become self-suﬃcient in agriculture. To achieve this goal, Arab countries
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81 See Jacqueline Klosek, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 8 INT’L LEGAL PERSP.
173 (1996) (The EC provides duty-free access to 46,000 tons per marketing year of
olive oil imported from Tunisia). While market access preferences may beneﬁt par-
ticular Arab suppliers at certain times, they generally oﬀer limited additional real mar-
ket access, and may not promote the long-term economic development of beneﬁciary
Arab countries. 
82 The EC struck bilateral agreements with certain Mediterranean countries such
as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. The U.S. charged the
EC with making unfair use of Article XXIV of GATT by granting most-favored-
nation treatment (MFN) to Mediterranean countries which are not members of the
EC. In 1985, an arbitration panel of GATT ruled that the EC should change its
tariﬀ structure with certain Mediterranean producers of lemons and oranges to lessen
the adverse eﬀects these tariﬀs had on U.S. exports of these fruits to the EC. See
Report of the Panel on European Community-Tariﬀ Treatment on Imports of Citrus
Products from Certain Countries in the Mediterranean Region, Feb. 7, 1985, GATT
Doc. No. L/5776 (unpublished GATT panel report).
83 The WTO Agreement on Agriculture recognizes the negative eﬀects of agricul-
tural liberalization. For this reason, WTO members adopted the Ministerial Decision
on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Eﬀects of the Reforming Program on
Least-developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries. Statistics show that
food prices rose sharply after entry into force of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.
Since then prices have been on the decline. For more on discussion the Ministerial
Decision and the eﬀects on food security see Desta, supra note 76, at 465-467. The
list of net food-importing countries includes Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan,
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. See WTO List of Net Food-Importing Developing
Countries, Mar. 26, 2002, WTO Doc. No. G/AG/5/Rev.5. 
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may want to increase farm spending, which has little impact on trade
and thus does not run afoul of WTO rules. For example, Arab countries
could establish support programs that include measures such as agricul-
tural research, restructuring aid, disease control, and regional assistance.
These support programs could also include forms of direct payments to
farmers as long as these payments are not linked to the type or amount
of crops being grown. 
Trade in genetically modiﬁed or bioengineered foods involves complex
factors. These factors include lack of scientiﬁc certainty on the possible
impact of agriculture biotechnology on human or animal health and the
environment, involvement of huge economic interests in the biotech food
trade, and the links that biotech food has to ethical and religious con-
cerns and biodiversity preservation. Arab countries, such as Sudan, have
imposed import bans or tight restrictions on genetically modiﬁed organ-
isms (“GMOs”) products. These Arab countries fear the contamination
of local crops by GMO strains which could aﬀect their ability to export
agricultural products to the EC, where there are strict controls on bio-
engineered foods. Arab countries may need to approve biotechnology in
order to boost food security. Bioengineered crops provide protection against
pests, or tolerance to chemicals. For example, in 2004, Algeria and Tunisia
experienced a slowdown in economic growth due in part to a locust infes-
tation that curbed agricultural output. Approval of bioengineered crops
could be accompanied by adequate labeling laws such as have been put
in place in Saudi Arabia. As a safety measure, the areas of GMOs crops
under cultivation could be separated from other areas of conventional
crops. In addition, as a safety measure, GMOs could pass through safety
and risk assessments before entering Arab countries.
Accession into the WTO would force the opening up of the domestic
agricultural commodity markets. To ease the burden of liberalization,
Arab countries can use the special safeguard mechanism included in the
WTO Agreement in Agriculture to shield local farmers from surging agri-
cultural products such as olive. Additionally, in WTO trade negotiations,
Arab net food-importing countries could be proponents of special and
diﬀerential treatment in agricultural export credits, oﬀered through export
credit agencies of developed countries, by arguing for longer maximum
repayment terms, minimum annual repayment of principal and interest,
favorable interest rates, and premium terms for food imports. 
Some Arab countries, such as Jordan and Sudan, currently are recip-
ients of food aid. As such, these Arab countries could argue for contin-
uing food aid in the form of in-kind donations and cash payments when
28 bashar h. malkawi
ALQ 20.1_f2_1-42  4/7/06  3:06 PM  Page 28
negotiating new WTO rules regarding the use of food aid. Any agricul-
tural trade reforms should not lead to a reduction in food aid delivered
to Arab countries. Arab countries should resist any proposals that would
limit food aid given in grants rather than credits, and food aid that takes
the form of cash donations rather than in-kind food donations. Cash
donations may take a longer time to reach targeted groups compared
with in-kind donations. Moreover, Arab countries could argue that food
aid should not be restricted only to deﬁned emergencies and humanitar-
ian crises. 
B. State-Owned Enterprises
Arab countries face the dilemma of the public/private sector dichotomy.
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are perceived as a drag on the economy
and the budget. Some believe in smaller government by reducing the
number of civil servants. It is also perceived that the future of Arab coun-
tries’ economies depends upon reform of SOEs. Usually, the public sec-
tor opposes trade liberalization, and the private sector backs it. When
SOEs were set up in 1960s, they were arms of the state, and they gen-
erated 40 percent of the GDP.84 These SOEs also account for a large
share of urban employment.85
The arguments then proceed along the following lines: These SOEs
suﬀer from an inability to reduce overmanned oﬃces coupled with bloated
anatomy of the case of arab countries and the wto 29
84 See Doing Business With Egypt 11, 17-25 (Marat Terterov ed. 2001). 
85 Public enterprises in Jordan employ a large number of employees. See Yitzhak
Reiter, The Palestinian-Transjordanian Rift: Economic Might and Political Power in Jordan, 58
The Middle East Journal 72, 77 (2004) (the top 500 private-owned enterprises have
JD5,814 million worth of assets with total employment of 44,839). See also David
Butter, The Public-Sector Problem in Syria, 37:22 MEED Middle E. Econ. Dig. 2
( June 4, 1993) (Syria is saddled with a huge public sector. The public sector employs
631,000 people, excluding the armed forces. This number accounts for 31 percent of
the total labor force. Public sector employees and all their dependants constitute 6
million people, out of Syria’s total population of 13.5 million). SOEs play a major
role in other Arab countries. For example, the public sector in Egypt comprises some
300 SOEs and employs 550,000 in the industrial sector alone. Libya intends to pri-
vatize roughly 360 SOEs. In Algeria, some 80 percent of industrial production remains
in the public sector. See Public Companies Open Further to Private Participation,
36:19 MEED Middle E. Econ. Dig. 20 (May 15, 1992). See Doing Business With
Saudi Arabia 5, 21 (Anthony Shoult ed., 2d ed., 2002) (the Saudi economy is cur-
rently in a state of transition as a consequence of the need to move from a focus on
public to private sector activity. Annual government spending represents one-third of
Saudi GDP. For example, in 1994, income payments to public sector employees
accounted for around 50 percent of total government spending). 
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payrolls. In these enterprises, political skills are far more important than
educational or managerial skills. The dilemma of the public/private sec-
tor dichotomy is further complicated if the public sector in Arab coun-
tries has an ethnic majority, while the private sector has a diﬀerent ethnic
structure. SOEs maintain advantages in obtaining government subsidies,
land rights, loans from state banks, and legalized monopolies in sectors
such as aviation and power. To put it bluntly, the private sector may not
enjoy a level playing ﬁeld. 
The balance between the public/private sectors also means that it takes
a longer time for reform to attain a socio-political balance. Taking into
account the abilities of the private sector and of all the SOEs, the real-
ity is that few may become conglomerates in a nasty international mar-
ket that recognizes only one thing: being lean and mean. The goal should
not be to squeeze one sector over the other. Rather, there must be a
potentially long-term partnership on a broad range of activities between
private enterprises and SOEs based on communication through work-
shops, cooperation, shared accountability, and mutual beneﬁt.86 In other
words, a national economy must be a private/public sector-led economy.
Moreover, creating a few large SOEs may lead to some Arab multina-
tionals that would be globally competitive and have reduced ineﬃciencies.
SOEs could become an issue for some Arab countries in the WTO.
If SOEs are also trading enterprises, WTO members would be concerned
about their operation, government involvement in their operation, and
whether they operate with commercial considerations. For example, Saudi
Arabia’s state trading enterprise for wheat could be become an issue
regarding the role of government in its operations. 
The ability of Arab countries to compete in international trade depends
on productivity, investment in human and physical capital, and research
and development. Several indicators suggest a decline in the competi-
tiveness of Arab countries. Intra-industry trade between 1985 and 1997
had been relatively slow, and shows little change when compared with
Brazil, Taiwan, and Malaysia.87 Many ﬁrms in Arab countries are dom-
inated by individuals, compete based on price alone, and lack manager-
ial and technological resources. Some domestic industries are mostly
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86 Long-term partnership may include outsourcing of non-essential functions to pri-
vate sector companies so as to allow SOEs to focus on their essential functions. For
example, notary services may be outsourced to private companies.
87 See Globalization and Firm Competitiveness in the Middle East and North
African Region 191-195 (Samiha Fawzy ed. 2002). 
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composed of family-owned small- and medium-sized enterprises.88 They
are concentrated in traditional labor-intensive industries such as textiles
and apparel, wood products, and non-metallic mineral products. There
are no available data on overall expenditures in research and develop-
ment, or the number of patents awarded in Arab countries and those of
Arabian origin. 
Arab countries should focus their eﬀorts on developing high-tech indus-
tries. Arab countries should also boost their support for research and
development, and improve their engineering and science education.
Competition will lead to increases in eﬃciency and creativity, which will
force domestic industries to adapt with the new climate.89
C. International Trade in Oil
Oil is the largest primary commodity traded internationally.90 Some Arab
countries are top suppliers of oil. They have a comparative cost advan-
tage since oil in these countries is cheap to pump. Therefore, Arab oil-
producing countries that are not yet members of the WTO, such as
Algeria, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, may have concerns over sub-
jecting oil to market forces.
Since the GATT came into existence in 1947, there has been an infor-
mal understanding among contracting parties not to subject oil and nat-
ural gas to multilateral tariﬀ concessions negotiations. However, it is a
misconception to claim that all aspects of energy trade, whether oil or
natural gas, are not covered or excluded by the WTO agreements. Over
the years, developed and developing countries have increased the num-
ber of goods governed by the disciplines of multilateral trading systems.91
As a matter of fact, Kuwait associated itself with a 1987 GATT case that
was concerned with the oil trade.92 If oil trade is not governed by GATT,
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88 For example, in Jordan 93 percent of establishments are small and medium-
sized enterprises. Id.
89 Through mergers, companies could be able to compete, invest in their produc-
tion systems, and strengthen their ﬁnancial positions. 
90 Fuel exports in 2002 stood at $615 billion, accounting for 9.8 percent of world
merchandise trade. See WTO Secretariat, International Trade Statistics for 2003 103,
114 (2003). 
91 In its accession to the WTO in 2001, China committed to allocate tariﬀ-rate
quotas for crude oil. China agreed to allow in prescribed amounts of oil at lower
tariﬀ levels. Oil imports above the quota levels are subject to higher tariﬀs. 
92 The Superfund case was brought by EC, Canada, and Mexico. A 1987 GATT
panel found that tariﬀs mandated by the U.S. Comprehensive Environmental Response,
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then the GATT panel would not have exercised jurisdiction in the mat-
ter. However, that case was limited to the consumer/importer side of the
oil trade. There has not yet been a case involving the producer/exporter
country side, for reasons such as setting prices or production targets.93
Additionally, oil trade is subject to domestic trade remedy laws.94 For
example, in 1999, a consortium of independent U.S. crude oil producers
alleged that companies in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, among other countries,
were dumping crude oil subsidized by the Saudi and Iraqi governments
in the U.S. market.95
One certainly can claim that oil trade is an “ambivalent” trade.96 On
the one hand, oil trade is supposedly covered by WTO agreements. On
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Compensation, and Liability Act, known as Superfund legislation, was in violation of
article III.2 of GATT (the non-discriminatory article). The U.S. charged imported oil
at a rate of 11.7 percent per barrel. On the other hand, it charged domestic oil at
a rate of 8.2 percent. The case is cited brieﬂy in Kwan kiat Sim, Rethinking the
Mandatory/discretionary Legislation Distinction in WTO Jurisprudence, 2 World Trade Rev.
33, 49-50 (2003). The other oil-related case is U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline case of
1996. However, the Reformulated Gasoline case was primarily concerned with an
environmental measure. For more on this “environmental” case see Reconciling
Envionment and Trade 163-292 (Edith Brown Weiss & John H. Jackson eds., 2001). 
93 See Rossella Brevetti, DeFazio Asks for WTO Case Against OPEC Production
Cuts, 21 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 565 (Apr. 1, 2004) (Rep. Peter DeFazio, along with
over 30 other House members, ﬁled a letter with President Bush asking to launch a
WTO case against OPEC. The letter alleges that OPEC supply restrictions are dis-
guised restrictions on international trade violating article XI of GATT 1994. Moreover,
the letter states that an article XX exception allowing restrictions for the conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources is inapplicable since OPEC is not restricting oil
production due to conservation concerns or to preserve an exhaustible supply). If a
WTO case is ﬁled, although it is unlikely for its political and economically-destabi-
lizing ramiﬁcations, it would be the ﬁrst WTO case on the producer/supplier side. 
94 Oil trade includes here crude oil, oil derivatives, and oil country tubular goods
that are used in the oil and gas industry such as tubes and drill pipes. 
95 The U.S. Department of Commerce denied the petition on the ground that
there was no suﬃcient support from the domestic industry to initiate an investigation
since opposition from U.S. producers exceeded support. On appeal, the CIT and
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit aﬃrmed the decision of the Commerce
Department. See Save Domestic Oil, Inc. v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1342
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2002) (stating that this was the ﬁrst case the Commerce Department
had rejected a petition at the ﬁling petition level). See also Save Domestic Oil v.
Commerce Department, 357 F.3d 1278, 1284 (C. A Fed. 2004) (the Commerce
Department does not have a standard practice applicable to all industries of disre-
garding the opposition of domestic importer-producers with import levels beyond a
certain percentage. There is an industry-speciﬁc analysis). One may speculate that the
Commerce Department rejected the dumping petition because imposing an anti-dump-
ing order would lead to political backlash from oil-producing countries as well as to
an increase in the price U.S. consumers would pay at the pump. 
96 See Francis N. Botchway, International Trade Regime and Energy Trade, 28 SYRA-
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the other hand, some oil production is managed by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) through supply control measures,
such as price targets or production quotas.97 There are many factors that
aﬀect trade in oil.98 OPEC Arab countries that are members of the WTO
such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have not changed their oil
policies because of joining the WTO. Therefore, Saudi Arabia and other
oil-exporting Arab countries can argue that a precedent exists for not
requiring oil-producing countries that acceded to the WTO to change
their policies. 
In acceding to the WTO, Arab countries may have to bind their tariﬀs
on oil imports, meaning that tariﬀs cannot increase above a certain ceil-
ing. Moreover, this implies that other oil-importing countries would reduce
and bind their tariﬀs based on reciprocity, thus giving an advantage to
Arab oil-exporting countries.99 The U.S. and other developed countries
should reduce their trade barriers to oil, such as high tariﬀs, discrimina-
tory taxes on fossil fuels, carbon taxes, and subsidies for coal and nuclear
energy.100
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CUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 1, 11, 12 (2001) (some of the theoretical reasons for
the apparent ambivalent attitude of contemporary international trade regimes to energy
trade include the deﬁnition of energy as good or service, which in itself is not with-
out controversy, location of energy at the heart of government economic thinking,
and energy as a vital national asset to be left to free international trade trajectories.
Movements in international regulation of energy are more likely to come from regional
or industry-determined economic blocs. The legal basis for OPEC is article XX(h) of
GATT, which permits import or export restrictions legislated by commodity agree-
ments. However, OPEC was not submitted for approved of the contracting parties
as required by article XX(h) of GATT). 
97 See Oil: A Burning Question, The Economist, Mar. 27, 2004 at 71 (citing the
OPEC cartel and its kingpin Saudi Arabia decision to cut production by 1 million
barrel per day).
98 For an overview of trade in oil see James M. Day, Petroleum Prices, 1 AM. U.
BUS. L. BRIEF 52, 53 (2004) (discussing the petroleum industry and factors that
aﬀect the industry, such as traders, weather reports, expectations of war, OPEC, cur-
rency value, taxes, lack of reﬁning capacity, and reﬁners’ proﬁts). 
99 For much of the twentieth century the U.S. maintained a tariﬀ on oil imports
to protect its petroleum industry against lower-priced competition from abroad. See
Michael A. Toman, International Oil Security: Problems and Policies, 20 BROOKINGS
REV. 20, 21 (2002). 
100 High tariﬀs are often maintained on processed products to keep value-added
production and employment in a certain market, while low tariﬀs are kept on raw
products. This is known as tariﬀ escalation. Some oil-importing countries impose
higher tariﬀs on processed oil in order to keep value-added production and employ-
ment in their markets. Exporting raw products may constitute a threat to Arab oil-
exporting countries’ economic stability because they are natural resources with little
value added. 
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A sticking point in Algeria’s and Saudi Arabia’s accession to the WTO
is a dual price policy for energy products such as gas and electricity,
which the U.S. and EC claim provides an indirect subsidy to industrial
producers and give them unfair advantage over foreign competitors. For
example, prices of some fertilizers are directly linked to the price of energy.
However, Algeria and Saudi Arabia may want to argue that WTO agree-
ments do not address or prohibit dual price energy policies. If their argu-
ment proves fruitless, they will have to agree to language in their WTO
accession that requires energy prices to be set according to commercial
considerations in terms of production costs and proﬁts, stage increases in
gas prices for industrial users, and allow exceptions to permit current
energy policies for non-industrial users and households, which would be
based on social considerations.
Energy services have never existed as a separate negotiating chapter
with a clear classiﬁcation in the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS). However, developed countries could demand Arab countries open
up foreign investment in oil exploration, extraction, production, and gas
development projects. In their accession, Arab countries should resist such
demands for reasons of important national policy. Oil extraction and pro-
duction can be classed as strategic. Arab countries will not have to pro-
vide equal access to U.S. ﬁrms for the exploration, exploitation and
processing of oil or natural gas found in their territories. Moreover, Arab
countries can argue that limiting market access in energy services is attrib-
uted to limits in their constitutions.101 Arab countries can carve out cer-
tain strategic energy-related activities from liberalization commitments.
VI. Arab Public Opinion and the WTO 
Although globalization has no speciﬁc deﬁnition, the most used meaning
is economic globalization. Trends of Arab public opinion regarding glob-
alization, and the WTO speciﬁcally, are mixed. In public, Arab govern-
ment oﬃcials speak the jargon of economic reform and free trade. On
the other hand, the Arab civil society expresses a pessimistic attitude
toward the multilateral trading system. 
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101 Constitutions of several Arab countries provide a provision that natural resources
are the property of the nation. See Bahrain Const. art. 11, Kuwait Const. art. 21,
and Qatar Const. art. 29.
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There are some reported incidents of an Arab anti-globalization move-
ment, and its visible presence, the WTO. In 2002, Arab activists from
Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories met in Beirut
and established a permanent Arab network, called the Arab Forum, to
resist globalization, and, implicitly, the WTO.102 The Arab Forum spelled
out its objectives: to exchange and coordinate information among orga-
nizations of Arab civil society, to represent a uniﬁed Arab position from
an unoﬃcial Arab perspective, and to lead protests against globalization. 
Even though there might not be an eﬀective way to determine the pat-
tern of Arab public opinion regarding globalization and the WTO, there
is evidence leading to the conclusion that anti-WTO/anti-globalization
sentiment exists among a large portion of the Arab population. For exam-
ple, the majority of the population in Jordan has less conﬁdence in glob-
alization than the populations of India, Mali, Argentina, and Bolivia.103
The Arab civil society is believed to have little enthusiasm for the gen-
eral free trade agenda that the WTO encourages.104 It does not acknowl-
edge the beneﬁts the WTO oﬀers.105 Trade liberalization is perceived as
a threat to cultural traditions.106 Arab countries should guard their sov-
ereignty and protect domestic industry from a ﬂood of foreign imports. 
Arab activists ﬁght against corporate greed that is destroying jobs and
wages. Arab activists recognize that globalization contributes to rising job
insecurity. Arab activists consider trade as a threat to jobs. The WTO,
as an institution, needs an overhaul to be able to address the interests of
Arab countries. Otherwise, the WTO will poison Arab public opinion on
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102 See Mustafa Abdalla Abulgasem, The Arab-Mediterranean Countries between the
Conditions of the Barcelona Process and the WTO: A Comparative Study, Conference on the
Arab Countries and the World Trade Organization: Economic and Social Impact
and the Prospects for Inter-Arab Cooperation, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies,
University of Exeter, U.K. (Sep. 23-25, 2002) (on ﬁle with author).
103 See Alan M. Field, Can Trade Bridge the Gap?, The Journal of Commerce
18 ( July 21, 2003) (a study found that Jordanians ranked last among the forty-four
countries surveyed when it came to assessing the eﬀects of globalization on their coun-
try. Sixty-four percent of Jordanians said it was bad compared with only twenty-seven
percent who said globalization was good).
104 See David R. Karasik, Securing the Peace Dividend in the Middle East: Amending GATT
Article XXIV to Allow Sectoral Preferences in Free Trade Areas, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 527,
545 (1997). 
105 Id.
106 Prince Bandar Bin Salman Bin Mohammad Al-Saud remarked that each coun-
try has its own experience, and the way it deals with foreign investment, e-commerce,
and WTO corresponds with its system, culture, and belief. See The International
Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, supra note 71, at 4. 
ALQ 20.1_f2_1-42  4/7/06  3:06 PM  Page 35
globalization and free trade, and this is likely to provoke a backlash against
more open economies. 
The WTO, as imperfect as it is now, is a better alternative to bilat-
eral trade agreements signed between developed countries and Arab coun-
tries. These include, for example, the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement,
the U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, the association agreements with
the EC, free trade agreements with the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA). In current bilateral trade agreements, economic hegemonies such
as the U.S. or EC dictate the rules and use them to their advantage. For
example, the EC association agreements adopt a selective agricultural
import policy by setting limits to the type and volume of farm products
imported into the EC market. The EFTA-Lebanon Free Trade Agreement
of 2004 includes intellectual property provisions that would restrict the
rights of poor farmers, and limit access to generic medicines.107
Conclusion
Legally, all Arab countries should be able to accede to the WTO. According
to article XII of the WTO Charter, any state having full autonomy in
the conduct of external commercial relations may accede to the WTO.
This article kick-starts the accession process. However, pragmatically, there
are other prerequisites, such as human rights, religious freedom, democ-
racy, and no-trade boycotts. Since Arab countries have their own cul-
tures and do not share all western values, they are banned from joining
the WTO. It seems that WTO accession is a power-based process, rather
than a rule-based process, as some legal scholars and WTO members
would claim. The U.S. backing of Arab countries to accede to the WTO
is based on American foreign policy rather than commercial considera-
tions. Syria, for example, is an important trade player in the region but
still outside the WTO club. Until other Arab countries join the trade
body, the universality theme of the WTO is simply a utopian dream. 
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107 For discussion on the U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement See David Price,
The U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement and Intellectual Property Protection, 7. 6 J. WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 829, 830 (Nov. 2004) (the FTA between the U.S.
and Bahrain includes provisions and conditions which will require Bahrain to make
signiﬁcant changes to its intellectual property laws and their enforcement. Many of
these required changes go far beyond the international benchmark of intellectual prop-
erty right protection as enshrined in the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights).
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Institutions are never perfect. The way the WTO as an institution runs
its business may not be perfect either. Certainly, the WTO needs a tune-
up to project a new image toward the Arab countries. The WTO should
permit accession of Arab countries into the organization at an acceler-
ated rate. In addition, the WTO Secretariat should have more staﬀ from
Arab countries, aside from French and Britons who hold most positions.
If the WTO were to hold a future Ministerial Conference in one of the
Arab countries, it should do so in a genuine and appropriate manner.
To illustrate, the fourth Ministerial Conference was held in Qatar because
of a fear that anti-globalization protestors might disrupt the proceedings
of the Conference, as it happened in the Seattle Ministerial Conference,
not because the WTO wanted to integrate Arab countries further into
the multilateral trading system, a claim advanced by WTO members.
Although for practical reasons the WTO uses “mini-ministerial” meetings,
where dozens of members are invited, the WTO should use them to a
minimum since they exclude Arab countries. The WTO should include
Arabic, a language spoken by 280 million people, as a working language
along with the other three working languages (English, Spanish, and
French) in the trade body.
Joining the WTO is a two-way street. Adhering to the rules of the
WTO may enhance global conﬁdence in the Arab countries, with the
likely result of increasing foreign direct investment. Consumers in Arab
countries would enjoy access to a wide variety of products that may oth-
erwise be unavailable. Thus, trade can have an overall positive eﬀect.
However, the dilemma is how to minimize any possible losses and cap-
ture any beneﬁts the multilateral trading system oﬀers. Economic reform
and trade liberalization must take into account social upheaval if hun-
dreds of thousands of SOE employees are tossed out of work quickly
without adequate guaranteed pensions. There will be losers among Arab
import-competing industries, but winners among industries and govern-
ments should compensate for the loss. Firms facing layoﬀs should give
their employees suﬃcient advance notice. Exportable industries should
employ or absorb those who face dislocations. Governments can aid those
who face dislocations because of increased competition by ensuring bet-
ter access to capital. Additionally, governments of Arab countries should
introduce policies aimed at cushioning the most vulnerable groups from
the eﬀects of trade liberalization by establishing adequate income sup-
port, health insurance coverage, re-employment projects, and training pro-
grams to develop the skills of those dislocated
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